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Public Finance and Private Markets
in Health Insurance
Mark V. Pauly ∗
Summary
This paper argues that the variation across countries in the
relative mix of public sector and private market roles in al-
locating medical care resources may be explained, not as
an evaluation of more or less efficient structures, but rather
as determined by differences in characteristics across coun-
tries that make one or the other way of organizing financ-
ing and production more appropriate. In particular, it is ar-
gued that the share of private financing and production is
likely to be higher than the degree of heterogeneity of pref-
erences across citizens in terms of the intensity of care, the
methods for control of moral hazard, the values attached to
new technology, the level of excess burden in the country’s
tax structure, and the extent to which monopsony power is
available to and attractive to government. Some informal
evidence is provided in support of this hypothesis, and it is
used to explain the evolution of the Medicare system in the
United States.
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Introduction
The balance between public sector activities and private markets in health care is
always delicate. Part of the reason for ambiguity, uncertainty, and controversy
surely is that, political platitudes to the contrary notwithstanding, there really is
not unanimous or even near-unanimous agreement among citizens in a democ-
racy over two fundamental questions: What are the goals for this sector, and how
do they trade off? Everyone will, of course, favor “high quality medical care for
all at low cost,” but that objective is probably (more about this adverb later) im-
possible in a world of constrained resources. My colleague William Kissick (1994)
talks about the “Iron Triangle” of health care in which, from the set of objectives–
high quality, universal access, and cost-containment–a society can choose any
two goals easily, but not all three.
Added to the issues which are of concern to health care aficionados are factors
that public economists also think to be important, such as the overall level of
redistribution in society and efficiency in the provision of public goods.
There is also substantial disagreement over how markets and governments can
and do perform. Although there is plenty of blame to go around, it is probably
correct to say that our comparative descriptive research on the performance of
private markets in health insurance and health care is more deficient than that on
public systems of various types. The obvious reason for this is that researchers
have had much less opportunity to observe private markets than to observe public
systems, just because the latter are typically more prevalent around the world and
more dominant than the former. That is, at best we know how private markets
work in the U.S., with its own culture and tax and regulatory structure, but not
how they would or could work elsewhere. And I think it fair to say that we have
never had the opportunity to observe “unfettered free markets” in health care, not
even in the United States, because of the omnipresence of regulation, subsidies,
and taxes. The most we can observe is “fettered markets” and we know in theory
and experience in practice the theory of the second best: that a combination of
semi-free markets with poorly designed regulation can actually be worse than
either “no market” or “all market.”
The next logical analytic step might seem to be to stop talking and to seek
treatment for despair. I will not take that step. Instead, I want to assemble the
arguments for why there should be a role for private markets in health insurance,
specifically, for whom, and in which circumstances. Some of these rationales will
be familiar, but I plan to pursue at some length some arguments I have not seen
treated so explicitly in the literature.
To be specific: a common way of discussing the relative mix of public and
private sectors in health care across countries or over time explicitly assumes that
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there exists an optimal mix, a normatively specified split of funding and/or provi-
sion which, within narrow limits, ought to characterize an efficient and equitable
health care system. Often this analysis is highly judgmental, resulting in some-
times emotional criticism (by Americans and non-Americans) of the American
system as much too reliant on a defective private market, or equally emotional
criticism of European systems as involving much too much government interven-
tion and attendant bureaucratic defects. I will argue here for a different view. I
will explore whether there are other, more or less exogenous characteristics of dif-
ferent societies that both predict, in broad terms, that these societies will choose
different public-private mixes and which, to a limited extent, offer normative sup-
port for these choices. I will not provide a “Panglossian whitewash” here and will
still allow for normative mistakes. But my fundamental point is that the scope
of these mistakes may be much smaller than one would judge simply by look-
ing at the variation in public-private mix in isolation. I will also argue that, if
viewed in the proper second-best framework, some of the usual arguments against
markets (largely having to do with static efficiency) are probably less important,
compared to others that were often neglected (largely dealing with values and
growth), which are perhaps more crucial. My main goal in this paper is to sug-
gest that those arguments may both recommend and predict different roles for the
private sector in different countries. I will summarize recent research by me and
others, apply these thoughts to the U.S. in general and recent disputes in Medicare,
and close with a plea for experimentation, tolerance, and more research.
1. Thinking Backwards
At this point, economic analysis of the roles of public and private sectors, for
health care or anything else, usually turns to a discussion of “market failure,” that
familiar terrain in which we discover (to feigned surprise) that the real world does
not replicate competitive equilibrium and so there is a prima facie case for some
public sector intervention (Feldstein, 1999).
In this discussion I want to reverse that model. I want instead to begin with a
world of perfect government (when it comes to resource allocation and technical
efficiency in health care), and then try to identify real-world situations in which
there is likely to be “government failure.” I do this not only because it is somewhat
more consistent with my intellectual upbringing, in which conventional welfare
economics received only grudging acceptance, but because (for the reasons men-
tioned above) it seems the approach more consistent with worldwide reality: given
the dominance of public sector arrangements in health care, we should begin with
an idealized benchmark for that arrangement and move down from there.
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So imagine that there could be an omniscient government able to reallocate
resources without transactions costs. This government would know everyone’s
utility function and every product’s production process, and would have at its
command lump sum taxes which it could use either to change the allocation
of resources to medical goods or services, or to redistribute purchasing power
among citizens. I assume that this government allows competitive markets to
work out resource allocation elsewhere in the economy, but reserves for itself the
task of determining what will happen with regard to health care. What would we
economists want it to do? (I will turn to the public choice question of what it or
another more realistic government is actually willing to do later in my discussion.)
Certain limitations lead me to the conclusion that in many circumstances gov-
ernment should probably not do everything in health care. These are not the
obvious limitations suggested by the theory of bureaucracy—that public officials
have no obvious strong incentives to meet voter desires or administer insurance
programs efficiently. Instead, I want to focus on three limits to efficient public sec-
tor resource allocations in a “best case scenario,” limits which (because they may
vary across countries) may be helpful in predicting the mix of government and
market activities which will be chosen. The three limits are (1) inherent uniformity,
(2) excess burden of taxation, and (3) the temptation of monopsony.
These limits can be spotlighted if we begin with a discussion of how an ide-
alized government might solve the resource allocation problem. Assume that a
set of citizens have a given distribution of income. The income can be taxed
by government; what remains is used to purchase a homogenous “non-medical”
consumption good. Taxes in turn can either be used for redistribution (with subsi-
dies as negative taxes), or to provide medical care. Medical care is a pure private
good in the Samuelsonian sense. The incidence of a single-period illness reflects
a random pattern from a non-contagious disease. Medical care treats that disease
according to a production function H = H(Ho,m) where Ho is the post-illness, pre-
treatment level of health, m is the amount of medical care, and ∂H/∂m varies
inversely with Ho and is positive for some values of Ho. People get utility from
the consumption good and H.
Suppose that people initially have identical incomes and identical preferences.
One possible decision rule for the government could be to allocate m to maximize
a representative person’s utility function, given income, and the health production
function. The value m* which solves this problem will vary by Ho, but be the same
for all at a given level of Ho.
Even in this stylized model, however, we may wish to invoke another mo-
tivation that seems virtually universal amongst human beings, even though no
one can prove it. It is possible that, at m = m*, citizens may feel that their fel-
low citizens are not using adequate amounts of medical care. The rationale for
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this “feeling” of a need sometimes to override purely individualistic consumption
and insurance decisions may either be ascribed to Musgrave’s “merit goods” idea
(Musgrave, 1959), or to the notion which I explored some years ago as a medical-
care-specific externality in individuals’ utility functions (Pauly, 1971).
At this point, I will not argue which of the two rationales is the more con-
vincing. I will simply leave the potential for altering resource allocation away
from the constrained individual-utility-maximizing level as a marker for the near-
universal propensity to tamper with private preferences for medical care even for
non-contagious diseases.
2. Preference Heterogeneity
The strongest argument for a government role in resource allocation is in the
case of a pure public good, which by definition (and technology) is efficiently
consumed equally by all. (At some cost, it is often possible to exclude non-payers
from access to a public good, but this would not be efficient.) Even in the case
of a pure public good, governments face a daunting task: to choose an allocation
of resources, a government must decide how much of the public good to provide.
In theory the solution to the problem is based on the Samuelson summation con-
dition, even though real governments are likely to have difficulty in determining
preferences for public goods and perhaps in achieving the theoretical optimum as
a political equilibrium.
In the case of a private good like medical care, the theoretically ideal govern-
ment could still solve the resource allocation problem. But now it would need
to know both the distribution of utility or demand functions and which individ-
ual goes with which preference. For both technical and, one suspects, political
reasons it may be hard for governments to treat different people differently.
In contrast, the strongest argument for private markets in my view is that
they can, usually at relatively low cost, allow people to satisfy different prefer-
ences. To be sure, they also offer strong incentives for cost minimization and
other dimensions of “efficiency,” but it is by no means obvious that the public
sector cannot come close in terms of productive efficiency itself. This depends
on whether public sector institutions can be structured to eliminate any benefit
from inefficient production. What the public sector cannot do is reproduce the
sensitivity to individual demands that vary across people often in ways that do
not have externally observable correlates. When it comes to medical care, even at
a given income level, people differ in their attitudes toward health, toward quality
of life, toward the side effects of care, toward risks, and toward tradeoffs between
the present and the future. When there is socially approved variation in income,
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this variation is modestly expanded (although the pure effects of income on the
demand for medical care seem swamped by preferences, in terms of explaining
the total variation in the demand for care given illness and prices).
I have elaborated on this idea at some length elsewhere (Pauly, 2002); here I
only summarize the most obvious implication: other things equal—and even in
the presence of a merit goods or altruistic externality approach—the normative
case for private markets is strongest in societies where the variation in demand
for care and/or insurance is greatest. Of special importance is variation in demand
at income levels above low income, where alternative motivations for affecting
resource allocation are likely to be less persuasive.
To the extent that there are the kinds of externalities I have mentioned, the
influences of individual preferences will be diminished if the “community demand”
function is uniform. One real question here is whether these external concerns—
the difference between m* and some social optimum—fall as m* rises with income.
For poor people, preferences do not matter, but for the upper middle class they
may be all that matter. In sum, a purely governmental system will do worse in
a prosperous country where people have very different demands for medical care
and health insurance.
It is surprising how little research there has been on variation in the demand
for medical care or medical insurance. Empirical evidence on this subject is hard
to find. One could poll or sample, although preference revelation may be a prob-
lem. Observations on actual markets, mostly in the U.S., does indicate some con-
siderable heterogeneity in preferences for insurers of different degrees of strictness,
and this heterogeneity is only modestly related to income. The variation in quan-
tity or quality demanded across people is larger for some procedures and illnesses
than others, as shown in the work of John Wennberg and others (Wennberg, Fisher
and Skinner, 2004), but there is no guarantee that this variation reflects patient
(as opposed to doctor) preferences.
But the resource allocation problem in medical care is made additionally com-
plex by the presence of randomness in the incidence of illness and consequent
demand for some type of insurance to spread risk. To the extent that such insur-
ance engenders moral hazard, there is another dimension of preference that needs
to be taken into account: preferences for risk reduction, on the one hand, and
preferences for the method and form in which moral hazard is controlled. Indeed
it is possible that there is more variation in these preferences for health insurance
and its management than in preferences for medical care per se—although the
solution to the problem of moral hazard control obviously depends as well on the
demand curves for medical care itself—plus other things.
Recent experience in the United States after a change in regulation that per-
mitted greater variety of insurance arrangements—the so-called “selective con-
no 15 - 2004 / 2
8
Mix Without Stirring: Public Finance and Private Markets in Health Insurance
tracting” revolution—is mixed on this point. On the one hand, it appeared that
consumer preferences for insurance were for a form quite different from the then-
prevailing (in private and public sectors) model of fee-for-service coverage of all
providers with modest patient cost sharing. On the other hand, the new market has
appeared to settle for modestly managed care with very large provider networks
as the single dominant product type. The expectation that there would be a wide
range of different plans of different degrees of moral hazard control and there-
fore different premium levels has generally not materialized. However, because
the range of options is usually offered in an employment based insurance setting
where tax subsidies distort preferences, and probably result in greater uniformity
than in their absence, definitive evidence on preference variation is not available
from observations on actual markets. Alternative methods to elicit preferences
might be helpful.
Not only would greater variation in preferences potentially induce a country
to provide more scope for private markets to offer variety in insurance coverage—
either by offering a variety of stand-alone private plans or, as in some continental
European countries, offer a variety of supplemental plans that can “custom tailor”
a single public plan, preference variation may also explain the unintentional emer-
gence of private markets. Specifically, offering a public plan of single design in a
country with a wide range of preferences is likely to leave some demanders unsat-
isfied at the margin, and therefore provide both the incentive and the supportive
economic environment for the emergence of private sector alternatives.
In principle there could either be a case for private plans that “add-on” or
“take away” from the public plan. In practice, the add-on case is likely to be more
conducive to the unplanned emergence of private alternatives. The “take away”
or “cash in” model may require an explicit ability to convert the level of spending
embodied in the public sector entitlement into something that can be reconverted
into cash. This is not impossible; the US Medicare plan permits people to partially
cash out the current level of Medicare spending if they choose a sufficiently frugal
private plan. But there clearly are greater administrative and political difficulties
in this case.
3. Excess Burden
Let us return to our idealized model of government resource allocation. That
ideal government determines both the level of medical care or insurance and other
consumption goods for each person. It makes lump sum transfers across individ-
uals to achieve the ideal level of other types of consumption, and determines the
level of medical care directly. Such lump sum taxes and transfers may not be
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feasible in a less idealized setting. Actual tax instruments used both to finance
medical care, to the extent that care and insurance are publicly financed, and
transfers of income for other consumption usually generate excess burden. The
optimal taxation literature helps us to understand how to design such tax instru-
ments to impose the least distortion on other choices in the economy (Auerbach,
1986). But, given both the political unattractiveness of simple head taxes and the
administrative infeasibility of complex ones, it is certain that any actual financing
system for medical care will impose some excess burden. The presence of excess
burden, and its potential variation across countries dependent on some character-
istics that I will now discuss, may also influence the desired level of public sector
spending on medical care and medical insurance.
To be more specific, if excess burden is positive, even the most idealized gov-
ernment will stop the public provision of medical care and medical insurance
short of the quantity that will be optimal for some of the population. This short-
fall in public spending then sets the stage for emergence of private alternatives
which may involve transactions costs in the use of markets but not excess burden.
This issue is also germane to the debate over the “efficiency” of publicly managed
insurers and plans relative to private plans. If there are externalities, the quantity
will stop short of the social optimum but not the private optimum, at least not on
average. However, a high excess burden may lead to abandonment of subsidies
and therefore private provisions. If there are publicly provided private goods, the
quantity may stop short of the private optimum.
Here I describe some simple elements of the complex theory of excess burden
minimization or optimal taxation. To begin with, the level of excess burden will
depend both on the tax instruments available to a country and the magnitude of
total public spending (but not specifically on the level of spending on medical
care). In effect, a country decides how it wants to distribute net consumption
as it determines how much medical care each person should get. If this desired
distribution is different from the initial distribution of income, and (for simplicity)
if it is tied to income, the linkage of taxes to an observable tax base will set in
place changes in behavior with regard to purchased consumption (in aggregate
or in terms of individual items), savings, and leisure that can reduce overall well-
being.
Obviously, the marginal excess burden of higher public spending on medical
care depends on how the additional taxes are imposed. For example, if financing
comes from a proportional increase in all existing taxes, the measure should cor-
respond to the “average marginal” excess burden. Alternatively, one might hope
(though not necessarily expect) that, if there are no additional distributional ob-
jectives to be achieved, the tax with the smallest excess burden is imposed. This
could be zero if the additional revenue is raised by what is effectively an incre-
mental lump-sum tax; this could be achieved, for example, by lowering the limit
no 15 - 2004 / 2
10
Mix Without Stirring: Public Finance and Private Markets in Health Insurance
on income exempt from income taxation. At the other extreme, if the medical
spending is financed by an earmarked tax (say, a payroll tax, as is the case with
U.S. Medicare and German sickness funds), and if there are no offsetting adjust-
ments elsewhere in the tax structure (see Pauly and Buchanan, 1970), the excess
burden would definitely be positive.
It does not appear that there has been much research on the form of taxes
used (at the margin) to pay for publicly financed health care, although this surely
varies across countries, so there may be some regularities to be discovered. The
implication then, going back to Pigou (1947) is that this additional cost should
influence how much of the public sector activities—redistribution and medical
care—a society would want to do.
It is less clear whether actual governments behave in this way. Brennan and
Buchanan (1980) have argued that in a public choice model voters constitutionally
assign governments tax bases with higher than optimal excess burdens in order to
constrain an hypothesized positive tendency for additional spending. The relative
cost of administering taxes on various tax bases may also vary across countries.
The key fundamental questions here are how observable is the “real” income or
other transfer-related characteristics (this is related to the extent to which individ-
uals will change behavior to reduce the size of the measured taxed characteristic),
and how large a transfer to the health care sector is envisioned. Since the excess
burden increases as the square of the tax rate, the deviation in medical spend-
ing relative to the first best optimum will increase the larger is the level of tax
financed spending. Exactly how this shortfall will vary as country level income
varies is not clear; a higher income country has more taxable capacity, but will
also seek to provide high levels of medical spending. An income elasticity of
spending greater than one will raise problems.
Other things being equal, the country whose tax system is associated with
larger excess burden will stop its publicly provided medical care and health in-
surance further short of the first best optimum. This leads in turn to an obvious
conclusion: that country is likely to have a larger private sector to supplement
the public spending. Of course, the size of the private sector depends on its own
administrative cost. There will be no excess burden in the private sector, but there
will be selling and billing costs for private insurance. The ideal outcome (and
perhaps the actual outcome) will depend on the relative sizes of the two costs.
Sometimes private insurance is criticized relative to public insurance because
the latter, being voluntary and on a smaller scale, will have larger administrative
costs. This analysis shows that there is another factor to be considered: the excess
burden (in addition to the pure administrative cost) of a country’s tax system.
A country with higher spending on other public goods, such as national defense,
will have a higher marginal excess burden, other things equal, and therefore might
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rationally choose to have a smaller level of spending on medical care and health
insurance, turning more of the task for the nonpoor over to the private sector.
This phenomenon, coupled with a strong sensitivity to the costs associated with
government, may help to explain the relatively larger size of the private sector
in the US system. Likewise, higher spending on other kinds of social welfare
(such as pensions) will raise the marginal cost of public financing of medical care;
this phenomenon may explain some recent European interest in private sector
financing.
To fix magnitudes: the net administrative cost percentage in the U.S. private
(group) insurance system is 10 to 15 percent. This is less than the typical estimate
of marginal excess burden cost, though these estimates cover a wide range. The
evidence is that, even with a relatively small public sector and relatively little
explicit redistribution in the U.S., the excess burden cost is substantial.
4. Public Sector Monopsony
Spending on medical care as a percentage of GDP varies across countries. For
a given level of GDP, spending differences will reflect both the quantities of real
inputs diverted into the medical sector and the prices paid to those inputs. There
is strong evidence that much of the higher medical care GDP share in the United
States is due to higher input prices relative to other countries. Adjusted for price
differences per se, the U.S. GDP share comes close to the middle of the pack for
developed countries (Pauly, 1993). In part these higher prices reflect higher pro-
ductivity in the economy as a whole. In part, they reflect market power (especially
for physicians) or patent protection that confers market power. In part, for com-
petitively supplied inputs like nursing, they reflect less explicit government buyer
control. But they also may well reflect a fairly decentralized price setting process
in the United States relative to a much more unitary and regulated system in most
other countries. More speculatively, the relative political influence of providers
may also affect the extent to which governments bargain for low prices.
I first consider “monopsony” here as a loose term meaning a large government
share in buying various medical care products. It seems clear that the national
state of medical services markets is one of monopolistic competition. Patented
products are, of course, sold by legal monopolists, although those products of-
ten have close substitutes. We do not know precisely the extent of monopoly
power individual producers have. The estimates of firm level demand curves for
physicians’ services find them to be highly elastic (say, with elasticities of 4 to
10), which implies that the markup over marginal cost is thus 33 percent or less.
Better consumer information about prices and qualities increases elasticity. Com-
pared to a market with some monopoly pricing, a large public buyer may initially
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improve efficiency by forcing prices down closer to the competitive level. How-
ever, if government is in near control of the market, the “price” only serves to
redistribute income. That is, government could pay some above-competitive price,
but demand the efficient quantity and then tax away any profits, if it wished.
A possible next step then would be for the public buyer to engage in true
monopsony. For some medical service supplied according to an upward sloping
supply curve, it would compare its estimates of marginal benefit or value with
the marginal price, which exceeds the average price because increments in price
are paid over inframarginal units. In common sense terms, it would hold down
the price it paid in order to restrict the quantity supplied, or (equivalently) it
would restrict the quantity it bought in order to keep the price down. A total
welfare-maximizing government would not push the quantity below the competi-
tive (non-monopoly) quantity or push the price below what would have been the
competitive level. The reason is that doing so reduces overall welfare as measured
by the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surpluses.
But a real-world government might be tempted to behave as a true monop-
sonist (not just a “destroyer of monopoly”) for two reasons. First, behaving as a
monopsonist could increase consumer (or average taxpayer) surplus, just by less
than it reduces producer surplus (Pauly, 1998). But if the suppliers of the special-
ized inputs into production of this service are few and lack political power, they
may not be able to resist. Second, behaving as a monopsonist reduces the gov-
ernment’s total budget. Such action might be pursued regardless of the fact that
monopsony pricing reduces quantity or quality of care, and regardless of the fact
that the lost benefit is greater than the saved resource cost—precisely because the
lost benefit is less than the saved budgetary cost. This is more than a hypothetical
possibility. The U.S. government, under the Vaccines for Children program, pays
for the bulk of pediatric vaccines in the United States, most of which are not un-
der patent protection and so might be thought to be approximately competitively
supplied. An Institute of Medicine committee on which I served concluded that
the price constraints imposed by the government were probably responsible for
a dramatic drop in the number of companies producing vaccines and consequent
chronic and serious shortages. The cost of these shortages, in terms of lost immu-
nization protection and parental time, may exceed the government’s budgetary
savings.
More generally, I want to explore the consequences of government behav-
ing explicitly as a monopsonist in setting payment rates for specialized health
care manpower and health care products (like drugs and devices) with large fixed
costs. Consider first the case of hospital care which is provided by specialized
workers (nurses and technicians) whose labor supply curve has a positive slope.
Government sets payment levels for hospital care, but those payments are largely
transferred as payments to workers.
économiepublique
13
dossier Mark V. Pauly
The market supply curve of hospital labor (and of hospital care itself) will
then have a marginal supply price which is greater than the marginal opportunity
cost. The idealized government will only pay attention to the marginal resource
cost, but there will be a strong temptation to government officials charged with
managing a limited budget to pay attention to the budgetary consequences of
higher prices or larger quantities. In such a situation, it would not be surprising
if government in setting prices would behave as a monopsonist, and restrain the
volume of services in order to avoid having to pay higher prices to inframarginal
workers. Indeed, government could act as a consumers’ cartel, which would max-
imize consumers’ welfare even as it reduced aggregate consumer and producer
surplus. Such behavior will provide an opportunity for a private sector. The rea-
son is that individual consumers (or even small private insurance plans) will not
take the supply-price-increasing effects of higher demand into account. In effect,
these buyers, paying attention only to the average price and not the marginal
price, will want to purchase larger quantities than those the government would
choose to supply. In a buyers’ cartel, for example, individual buyers will always
want to buy more at the monopsony price than the cartel wants to buy. The result
will be a demand for private insurance that would break the buyers’ cartel that
government is trying to maintain. To hold down unit prices, government limits
supply, but at those low prices there will be substantial unsatisfied demand at the
margin.
This model is ambiguous in terms of predictions about sector roles as a func-
tion of the opportunity for monopsonistic behavior. A key parameter is the elastic-
ity of supply; the less elastic, the greater the gains from monopsony. Practically,
countries probably do differ in terms of the alternatives available to workers with
specific health care training. In the United States, for example, registered nurses
can and do drop in and drop out of working as nurses in hospitals depending on
the wages there relative to the wages educated women can get elsewhere. My per-
ception is that in some European countries where culture and regulation attach
people more to a “calling” there may be a less elastic response to lower wages.
This means that, on the one hand, there will be less of a reward to engage in
monopsonistic behavior in the United States, but also less of a gap for private
purchases to fill if such behavior does occur.
The situation for pharmaceuticals and devices is different. Here the relevant
supply curve (if there is one) is the schedule of marginal cost of production of the
product, which probably does not increase with volume and may even fall. There
is a supply curve of new products, which probably is upward sloping, however, as
I will discuss below. What actually happens in the case of existing products is not
well understood.
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5. Public-Private Mix and the Growth in
Medical Supply and Technology
The last point I wish to discuss briefly is the theoretical and normative relation-
ship between the public-private mix and the rate of growth of medical spending.
This discussion is brief because little is known about the subject, not because it is
unimportant; quite the contrary. What we do know is that much of the growth in
demographically and input-price adjusted medical spending across countries and
over time is associated with the addition of new medical products and procedures
that are more costly than their predecessors yet, recent research tells us, contrib-
utory to health improvements (Cutler and McClellan, 2001). We also suspect that,
positively, higher levels of public involvement slow the growth of spending. How-
ever, somewhat embarrassingly, given the importance of technology to spending
growth and given the importance of spending growth to public policy, the great
bulk of normative research uses static models and therefore says little about the
efficiency of this part of change over time. Here I offer a few thoughts on whether
efforts to deal with changes in technology over time might explain the mix of
public and private sectors across countries.
The most important thing to say is something most obvious to economists but
not to policymakers. Low growth rates of medical spending are not necessarily
preferable to higher rates if the lower spending growth is associated with lower
rates of introduction of beneficial but costly new technology. The converse is
of course also true: higher rates are not necessarily better either. The proper
normative conclusion here so far is aggressively nihilistic: differences in spending
growth rates per se do not yield normative conclusions.
We have a little normative theory that can be helpful here, but it also is
incomplete. If a private market has competitive insurance plans, and if each
plan is free to cover or to refuse to cover new technology on a selective basis,
there should be no technology covered in the competitive equilibrium that is
inefficient, in the sense of negative aggregated discounted net benefits, assuming
away imperfect information and adverse selection (Pauly, 2003). The intuition is
that, despite moral hazard, adding coverage will only be undertaken if there is
positive net benefit to members of the insurance plan—that is, if the benefit from
the technology exceeds the cost it adds to the premium. And, going back a stage,
the new technology will only be brought to market if the expected revenues it
would generate in a competitively priced insurance market exceeds (in present
value terms) the sum of all costs: research and development, production, and
distribution.
This is, however, a fairly small claim for efficiency. It does not say that all
technologies with potentially positive net benefits will be available in market
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equilibriums, or that technologies which are available will be optimally used. We
know the sources of potential deviations from the best case: the fixed costs of
research and development, the inability to engage in discriminatory pricing, and
most troublesome of all, the dependence of the final outcome on the rules about
intellectual property embodied in patent laws. Legal rules regarding coverage will
also matter. This all leads generally to nihilism on normative matters.
My conjecture here, based on all of the examples of deviation from first-best
optimum that I have been able to develop so far, is that, given patent rules, the
rate of adoption of new technology in competitive insurance markets, rather than
being too rapid, will probably be too slow. Thus, if the real rate of adoption
in new technology in public systems is slower than that in private systems, that
public rate must also be too low. This is not equivalent to comparing rates of
growth in spending, since spending is affected by pricing differences as well as
real inputs. But it does suggest that there are worse faults to markets than high
rates of medical spending growth.
That is the most defensive thing I will say about private markets relative to the
public sector. There may be something more useful that can be said about positive
choices. I will discuss the two easiest cases first. It is likely that citizens differ
not only in their preferences for existing medical services, but also in terms of
their preferences for the rate of addition of new technology. That is, people may
have different marginal propensities to spend on new technology, and the extent
of this variation may also vary across countries. Here again, private markets are
probably better suited to offer choice about the pace and form of new technology
than public systems. I do not know of any private insurer in the United States
that has adopted as its slogan “We Cover All the New Products You Could Get
in Canada” or “Last Year’s Technology at Last Year’s Premiums,” but it does seem
that there is considerable variation across plans in the alacrity with which they
agree to pay for new things and the permissiveness they give to providers and
patients to use them.
It also seems that the supply curve of new technology is upward-sloping and
therefore subject to monopsonistic behavior. What will happen is more specula-
tive here because discriminating monopsony seems possible. Agreeing to pay for
the technology with the smallest net benefit does not necessarily imply higher
payment for inframarginal candidates with larger benefits—although adoption of
uniform cost-effectiveness rules may push a little in this direction.
I do not have anything to contribute on the relationship of excess burden of
the tax system and new technology. There is a dynamic optimal taxation problem
here and, to my knowledge, it has not been addressed, much less solved.
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6. Politics and Policy
These observations about the relative roles of public and private sector financ-
ing were made without paying attention to the specific regulatory and financing
structure of the publicly financed sector. On the one hand, this omission may
be important because that structure may influence how easy it is for citizens to
engage in private supplementation to the public programs. On the other hand, the
structure itself presumably depends on attitudes/efficiency/pressure for private
supplementation. In this section I explore two alternative public sector views of
private activity: “necessary evil” and “positive proactive.”
The necessary evil view is one held by many. The emergence of markets makes
embarrassingly clear the deficiencies of government. Or there may be a belief that
somehow markets are preventing government, at long last, from solving its own
problems, because markets may take off some of the political pressure. Finally,
despite the theoretical availability of redistribution, there may be a belief that
private markets somehow make inequity worse.
The positive proactive view of the private sector reverses the model pursued
so far and asks how the private sector could be used if it were desired (on a priori
grounds) to minimize the role of the public sector. In this approach all production
would be postulated to be private, but the government would necessarily play the
role of financing insurance and care for at least some part of the population. Since
any plan to transfer resources has implications for incentives, there are some key
design issues.
Preference diversity and excess burden again come into play. One approach to
minimizing the role of government is to minimize its involvement with those parts
of the population which can and will arrange what would be regarded as adequate
insurance and adequate care on their own. This would generally include (though
not necessarily be limited to) middle and higher income households. While there
may still be underuse of some preventive care, it is impossible to believe that
additional care beyond what reasonably well-off citizens get, given the private
insurance they would choose, would be a matter of major social concern. The
problem then is that if subsidies are made available to lower income households
but need to be phased out as income increases, that “income tax” necessarily
generates an excess burden. While an income-based tax system would be less
heavily used than if uniform subsidies were offered to all, the net effect would
still be one that distorts worker incentives to obtain a higher measured income or
a higher level of whatever indicator is used to establish eligibility.
Preference diversity also matters because any subsidy for insurance must spec-
ify the characteristics of the insurance which qualify for subsidy. The more tightly
specified are the terms of eligibility, the lower the voluntary take-up rate of any
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given subsidy. But paying for “any old insurance” is difficult to justify and even
harder to administer. Presumably the greater the preference diversity among po-
tential subsidy recipients, the greater the need for rules but the greater the oppor-
tunity for rules to do harm. What is also relevant here is the strength of collective
preferences for modification of the market equilibrium; more precisely formed
preferences for what kind of health care subsidy recipients are supposed to con-
sume argues for stricter rules but either lower take-up or the need for a larger
subsidy.
However, here is a way to think about the optimal subsidy problem. Assume
that the specification of the minimum acceptable level of nominal insurance cov-
erage is given and is uniform across the population. (Derivation of the optimal
policy will require information on the impact of coverage on the use of medical
care helpful moral hazard and the benefits health or altruistic that flow from that
care.) Define demand curves for this coverage for various population subgroups,
and an acceptable proportion of each subgroup to obtain this coverage. Then
provide the subsidy (in the form of a lump sum credit) to each subgroup needed
to get the target proportion to purchase the target policy (or better). If the subsidy
for higher risk groups needs to be higher to induce them to pay the higher risk
rated premiums they would be charged, risk adjust the subsidy.
This simple version will not be perfect if the targeting of subsidies is imperfect.
The alternative design specifies the subsidy in terms of a proportion of an estimate
of the premium for the target insurance plan. This avoids the need to risk adjust,
but also leads potentially to less efficient search and over-insurance.
The main point is that either version can lead to an optimal outcome achieved
in an optimal way. Objections to voucher schemes are usually political: compared
to uniform social insurance, fewer of the electorate will support schemes for in-
come conditioned subsidies. This is not a relevant argument in welfare economics.
Some objections to uniform coverage are more substantive, but remediable.
If the optimal level of coinsurance is positive, there is a fear that lower income
people will be “discouraged” from purchasing effective care, and that all people
may be deterred from purchasing certain kinds of care (usually preventive care)
which, though highly effective, for some reason has very low demand. The solu-
tion to these problems—if they turn out to be real problems—is to vary the level of
coverage across population or care subgroups, making coverage more generous
when greater stimulus is needed.
Beyond these design issues, the primary practical analytic problem is the spec-
ification of the “ideal” coverage and the “ideal” take-up rate if coverage choice is
to be voluntary. The primary advantage of full tax financing is that take-up will
be universal, although this goal can in principle also be achieved by mandating
private purchase coverage. Once coverage is mandated, however, the need for
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subsidy disappears except as required to achieve other distributional objectives.
The preceding theory suggests three positive predictions and normative deter-
minants of the private sector share in medical care and medical insurance: devia-
tions of preferences, relative excess burden of the tax system, and scope for public
sector monopsony. I now want to consider, in an informal way, whether these in-
fluences can explain the difference in shares which I know best: the higher private
sector share in the United States. (I leave to others a more formal empirical anal-
ysis of whether these influences provide an explanation for sectoral differences
across a much wider range of countries.)
With regard to differences in preferences, it does seem plausible (though it
should also be investigated more formally) that there is more variation in “de-
mand” (broadly defined) in the U.S. than in other countries. We do know that
disposable incomes vary more widely in the U.S. (around a higher mean). “Pref-
erences” here means differences in demand for both the quantity of care and the
quality, the extent of insurance coverage (relative to out-of-pocket payment) and,
probably most importantly in recent years, the form and strictness of supply-side
cost containment or rationing measures imposed either by government or by pri-
vate “managed care” insurance plans. All of these potentially vary with income,
although the highest income elasticities seem to apply to the quality of care (pos-
itive) and to the strictness of supply-side rationing (negative). My impression is
that there is also more variation in tastes, given income, in the U.S. than elsewhere,
but it is hard to determine the variation in heavily publicly controlled settings that
do not respond to private demands. We might also allow for people to have pref-
erences about the extent to which individual demands should be accommodated,
but it is hard to identify the influence independently.
With regard to the marginal welfare cost or excess burden of taxation, this
depends on the breadth of the tax base, the efficiency of administration of the
tax system (and the two are related), along with the level of taxes for other types
of public spending. Here I would not imagine that the U.S. is subject to stronger
pro-market influences than other developed countries in general, since its overall
tax base is relatively broad and its tax rates for other things are more modest.
Compared to developing countries, it should on this score probably have a larger
public sector. However, it is my sense that there is more explicit concern for
the distortions implicit by taxation in the U.S., the usual code-words being “the
crushing burden of taxation,” though that influence is not one targeted by the
simple theory described earlier.
As for the role of monopsony or government purchasing power, here I would
suggest that there is less scope in the U.S. for price reductions from govern-
ment purchasing, should the ideological winds blow in that direction. Because
of strong enforcement of anti-trust laws against physicians, there is probably lit-
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tle monopoly power to be reduced, and private managed care plans have also
already pressed down prices (usually through discounting) successfully for hos-
pital care. On the input side, as already noted, supply curves are probably less
steep than in other countries, so there will be less temptation toward monopsony.
Prices, in short, are probably close to long-run marginal cost, so there is no need
and no gain from government intervention.
This is surely not to deny that total medical spending—and wages of nurses,
technicians, and physicians—are high (by almost any standard) compared to other
countries. Likewise, the rate of addition of costly but beneficial new technology
may be highest. But the actual quantity of inputs is actually quite modest, and
the additional technology and convenience is almost surely worth its cost to the
middle class buyers who pay for it. The situation is less clear for outpatient
pharmaceuticals. While the share of drug-spending in the U.S. (at 10 percent of
national health spending) is relatively modest, the prices of patented-protected
drugs are high. (Those for the more frequently used generics are low.) There is
some doubt as to whether prices could be reduced by government for the existing
variety of products, relative to what is done by private managed-care insurers, but
there is little doubt that drug spending could be cut if the range of products was
reduced and the rate of introduction of new products fell. Such steps are probably
inhibited by the very large proportion of patented products that are domestically
produced (rather than bought from foreigners); price reductions translate more
immediately into profit reductions for American firms and job losses for American
workers. Still, if there is to be an expansion of the role of the public sector for the
non-poor in the U.S., it will probably be driven more by a desire for lower drug
prices than by anything else.
7. Beyond Theory: Public and Private
Interaction, Past and Future, in the US
Medicare Program
The preceding theory has been tested to some extent in the design and evo-
lution of the Medicare program in the United States. I will comment on some
implications for the theory from the history of that program, and from the debate
which lead to a modest restructuring of the program. Of course, attempts to prove
general propositions from single historical examples can at best be suggestive, not
definitive.
Medicare is a tax financed insurance program to furnish health insurance to
the elderly, the disabled, and people with kidney failure. The beneficiary premium
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covers approximately 10 percent of the program’s cost. The remaining part of
the program is financed by a combination of payroll taxes and general revenue
financing. The subsidized coverage includes patient cost sharing for hospital and
physician care and, in the new prescription drug program to be effective in 2006,
outpatient drugs.
From the moment it was put in place in 1966, this program experienced sup-
plementation. One kind of supplementation came from state governments, who
gradually chose to cover the cost sharing, beneficiary premiums, and some un-
covered types of care (nursing home and drugs) under their “Medicaid” program
for low income people. The proportion of people on Medicare with this assistance
is now approximately 10 percent. The other kind of supplementation came from
the private sector which furnished supplementary insurance. This insurance in
turn had two major sources: voluntarily and individually purchased “Medigap”
insurance, and insurance furnished to workers as a tax shielded post-retirement
benefit. The combination of these three sources means that about 89 percent of
beneficiaries have some kind of supplementary coverage.
This pattern would certainly be consistent with the hypothesis that the design
of the government run insurance program left some demanders (public and pri-
vate) unsatisfied. It is also the case that each type of supplementary insurance, in
lowering user prices for services covered by the basic plan, increased the use and
cost of those services. In this sense there was an implicit and probably unintended
public subsidy to private coverage, because the premium for the public insurance
was unaffected by the presence of supplementary insurance, even though the ex-
pected benefits where substantially higher for those with supplementary coverage.
There has been some, largely dysfunctional, regulation of individual Medigap cov-
erage over the years, but no attempt to incorporate it into the public plan.
Another issue for US Medicare is whether the basic governmental plan could
be supplanted by a set of private plans. Changes made in the 1980s to accommo-
date private managed care plans (HMOs) have already given an affirmative answer
to this question, though it is still debated in hindsight. Beneficiaries are permitted
to take an estimate of their expected cost under the government run plan and use
that to offset the premiums for qualified private plans. Those private plans must
provide at least the same nominal benefits as the public plan, but they can pay
providers in different ways, refuse to contract with providers which are eligible
for the public plan, charge additional premiums, and provide additional benefits.
Many of these plans provide outpatient drug benefits even now, and some of them
originally did so at zero additional premium.
The remaining issue being debated is that of how to set the initial voucher
value and the beneficiary premium for the public coverage. An approach to be
tried in the future on an experimental basis is to set that amount at a level poten-
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tially different from the expected cost in the public program. Instead, a kind of
bidding process would be implemented. Different private insurers and the public
insurer would “bid” on a risk adjusted premium for the nominal benefit package.
The low bid would then define the value of the voucher, and “losers” would be
required to charge and accept higher premiums for their coverage. (That is, the
losers would not be punished by being denied the contract, but just by being
forced to charge a high premium based on their initial bid.) Because the bidding
process does not specify the quality of the insurance or care to be given, this
process is incompletely specified from an economic perspective.
Controversy arises from the fear that the public program will not be the low
bidder, but will somehow attract high risk and high cost beneficiaries without
adequate risk adjustments in the voucher value. Then the public plan may be
unable to cover its costs and perform its hypothesized safety-net function. Beyond
this, there is a reverence for the public plan on the part of many that I do not
share, but which I have tried to understand. The key empirical/policy question
is the adequacy of risk adjustment, and expectation about the quality of care for
high risk beneficiaries in private plans.
Since the subsidy rate in the Medicare program is so high, there will not be a
problem of takeup. The most serious problem is that of future financing which in
turn is related to high anticipated excess burden cost of taxes needed to finance
the program at expected future levels of cost and demographics. I anticipate
a serious shortfall prompting serious argument, but that argument has not yet
begun.
What is unlikely to be changed in the near future in the U.S. is the large-scale
tax revenue support for Medicare, which currently covers 90 percent of program
costs. The recently passed Medicare Reform Bill does very modestly increase the
contribution of rich retirees (without offering them a different insurance plan), and
the drug coverage, even with a price tag of $50 billion per year, will only cover
10 to 15 percent of total drug expenses for seniors. In the short run, however,
Americans will be satisfied with limiting the private sector to competition by
private firms for the use of a very generously publicly-funded voucher. There
is great concern, however, about future Medicare spending over time. Some of
this concern is exacerbated by the trust fund structure of Medicare. But the
primary reason for concern is, in terms of my theory, the anticipated much higher
excess burden of the taxes needed to support Medicare at its traditional level
of generosity as the Baby Boom retires with continued expectations of access to
costly new technology. That will be a titanic struggle between tax-financed public
sector support less distortive private projects. If I am lucky, I will be around to
watch.
no 15 - 2004 / 2
22
Mix Without Stirring: Public Finance and Private Markets in Health Insurance
8. Conclusions:
Suggestions for Policy and Research
I have offered some suggestions to explain the variation across countries in
the relative shares of public and private sectors in health care and health insur-
ance. Although the limited number of observations makes it hard to test these
hypotheses, one should try some empirical work. One might also try to identify
those countries with more or less private market share than they “should” have,
given their characteristics. Personally, I would prefer an enlargement of tax sup-
port to cover insurance for all poor and near-poor people in the U.S., including
able-bodied adults who currently lack access to subsidized coverage. I am less
bold to comment on whether some European countries might have residuals of
the opposite sign, with too much government and not enough market. I do think
more experimentation with true markets (not the “managed competition” carica-
ture) for the non-poor parts of the population would be interesting to observe,
and might be a useful exploration in anticipation of Europe’s new demography-
driven excess burden crises. Americans are not presently in a good position to
offer advice on this matter (or on many other matters), but I do feel comfort-
able encouraging introspection, an open mind, and a moratorium on invidious
cross-country comparisons.
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